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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

This section includes (A) a description of the nature of the case; (B) a history 0f the
proceedings; and (C) a statement of the material facts.

A. Nature 0f the Case
This case arises from an agreement incidental to a zone change. In 2006, Burns Concrete

purchased property near Driggs With the intent t0 transfer the property t0 Burns Holdings for the

development of a concrete batch

plant.

Burns Holdings applied for rezoning, and Teton County

granted the rezone subject t0 an agreement t0 address dust, trafﬁc and other concerns. Burns

Holdings executed a development agreement dated August 31, 2007. Then, Burns Concrete
erected a temporary batch plant to produce concrete While Burns Holdings

worked

to get

approval for a permanent plant. In 2007, and again in 2010, Teton County denied requests from

Burns Holdings

permanent plant

to allow the

to

exceed the County’s 45-foot height

Burns Concrete closed the temporary plant in January 2010.

Two

years

later, in

restriction.

April 2012,

Teton County demanded that Burns Concrete remove the temporary plant and cease operations.

Burns Concrete did not comply. In October 2012, Teton County renewed
Burns Concrete did not comply.

On May 21,

bench

trial

in favor

0n damages, the

relief.

The

1

liability;

granted

and, after a

awarded the Burns Companies $1,049,250.90. Teton

County now appeals, and the Burns Companies cross-appeal.
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district court ultimately

0f the Burns Companies on breach 0f contract
district court

demand. Again,

2013, Burns Concrete brought this suit against

Teton County seeking contract damages and other

summary judgment

its

B. Course 0f Proceedings
This

is

the second action and third appeal arising

agreement between Teton County and

Bums

from an August 3 1 2007 development
,

Holdings. After entering the agreement, Burns

Holdings applied for a conditional use permit to construct a concrete batch plant. Teton County

Bums Holdings, LLC v.

denied the permit, and Burns Holdings sought judicial review.
County, Case N0. CV-2007-376 (Idaho
the Idaho

Supreme Court ruled

in favor

7th Dist.
Ct.,

Teton Cnty., ﬁled Dec.

Teton

11, 2007.) In

2012,

of Teton County, holding that Burns Holdings should

have applied for a variance, rather than a conditional use permit,

t0

exceed the County’s height

restriction.

In 2012, Burns Holdings applied for a variance. Teton

County denied the application

for

variance. Burns Holdings did not seek judicial review.

In 2013, Burns Concrete and Burns Holdings sued Teton

County

for declaratory

judgment, breach of contract, rescission, and unjust enrichment. Teton County counterclaimed
for breach

of contract and declaratory judgment. In 2015, the

judgment

in favor

prejudice.

As

district court issued

summary

of Teton County and dismissed the Burns Companies’ complaint with

part 0f its judgment, the district court declared that the temporary facility violates

Teton County’s zoning laws. The Burns Companies’ appealed.

Supreme Court vacate the judgement and remand

On remand,

the district court granted

Companies, holding
issue 0f damages for

that

On November

1,

2016, the Idaho

the case to the district court.

summary judgment

in favor

0f the Burns

Teton County breached the development agreement, and reserving the

trial.

A bench trial concluded on May 11, 2018. The district court issued
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on October
18,

4,

2018, and amended Findings on January

2019, awarding joint damages t0 the Burns Companies 0f $1,049,250.90. The Court entered

judgment 0n February 28, 2019.

On

September

9,

2019, the

district court

awarded an additional

$792,529.25 in attorney’s fees and $3,886.40 in costs to the Burns Companies.1 Teton County

now

Companies cross—appeal.

appeals, and the Burns

C. Statement 0f Facts

The

1.

Parties t0 this action are Plaintiff Burns Concrete, Inc. (“Burns Concrete”),

Plaintiff Burns Holdings,

(R., P. 20.)

LLC

(“Burns Holdings”) and Defendant Teton County (the “C0unty”).

may be referred t0

collectively as “Plaintiffs” or

County may be referred

t0 collectively as the “Parties’

Burns Concrete and Burns Holdings

the “Burns Companies”. Plaintiffs and the

9

and individually as a “Party”?

1

Companies ﬁled a motion in the
district court for reconsideration of the award of Attorney’s Fees and Costs. Teton County Will
timely ﬁle a separate notice appealing the award 0f attorney’s fees and costs following a decision
on the Burns Companies’ motion for reconsideration.
2

Prior t0 the submission 0f this Appellant’s Brief, the Burns

References to the record are abbreviated as follows:

“AR.”

refers t0 the

Augmented Record ordered 0n March7, 2019 and

consisting 0f 184

Pages;

“EX.” refers t0 the Record Exhibits consisting 0f 670 pages;
“R.” refers t0 the Clerks Record 0n Appeal consisting 0f 284 pages;

“Supp. R.” refers t0 Supplemental Record consisting 0f two volumes 0f 410 pages;
“Supp. EX.” refers t0 the Supplemental Record Exhibits consisting 0f 259 pages; and
“Tr.” refers t0 the Trial Transcript (page references cite t0 the page and line

embedded by the
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court reporter rather than the

number
number superimposed by the clerk).

2.

By deeds

property at 1723 North

3.

dated

December

Highway

18, 2006,

Burns Concrete acquired two parcels of real

33, Driggs, Idaho (the “Property”). (EX.

1

;

Ex. 2.)

Burns Holdings applied t0 rezone the Property from C-3 (commercial) t0 M-l

(light industrial). (R., P. 205.)

4.

The County conducted a public hearing 0n February

26, 2007. (Ex. P, P. 8.)

Speaking on behalf of Burns Holdings, Kirk Burns told the Board 0f County Commissioners “the
plant will have a 7,000 sq.

ft.

footprint with a 45’ tower.” (EX. P, P. 8.)

zone change on the date of the hearing, subject
other requirements. (See EX. P, P.

5.

is

3.)

Burns Concrete

not identiﬁed in the Agreement. (EX.

is

not a party to the

3.)

Burns Concrete erected a temporary concrete batch plant 0n the Property and

began operating

it

in

November 2007.

The temporary plant

is

(Tr., P.

388, L.

8.)

approximately 65-feet high. (TL, P. 388, L.

have not applied for a height variance for the temporary plant.
8.

0f a development agreement and

Burns Holdings entered the Developer’s Agreement for Burns Holdings, LLC,

Agreement and

7.

the

8.)

dated August 31, 2007 (the “Agreement”). (EX.

6.

to the execution

The County approved

(Tr., P.

8.) Plaintiffs

398, L. 16.)

Burns Concrete ceased operating the temporary plant around January 2010. (TL,

P. 388, L. 13; Tr., P. 14, L. 6.)

9.

When Burns

for concrete. (EX. D.)

213, L. 22.)

Concrete purchased the Property,

According

“We were

t0

anticipated increasing

demand

Burns Concrete: “Everything was getting strong.” (TL,

all in that la-la
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it

P.

land time period as far as the building, with people buying

houses from

work

all

at that time. (Tr., P. 364, L. 22.)

From 2008 through 201 1,

10.

466,

over.” (Id.) Teton Valley had a lot of commercial and residential construction

1.

the Teton

County construction market crashed. (TL,

P.

21 .) The construction market began to recover in 2012. (TL, P. 382, L. 17.)However, the

recovery has been slow. (Id)

Burns Concrete’s business

11.

Concrete ceased operations

According

12.

at the

started t0 decline in 2009. (TL, P. 382, L. 4.)

temporary plant in 2010.

t0 forensic accountant

(Tr., P.

Burns

388, L. 13; Tr., P. 14, L. 6.)

Richard Hoffman, the cessation 0f operations

is

signiﬁcant:

[T]hat’s meaningful to

way that’s

me because that shows that Burns — Burns

entirely consistent with

consistent With

The plant —

my calculations

and —

Concrete behaved in a

and, frankly,

is

the temporary plant

was not generating enough money during

period that the Burns’ ﬁnancial showed they were in desperate ﬁnancial

And the
.

.

ﬁnancials

show

.[T]he fact that they

with

entirely

common good business practices.

my analysis

.

.

that

that time

straits.

Burns began liquidating assets in order to pay down debts.

would shut down

voluntarily during this time period

is

consistent

.

(TL, P. 540, L. 19.)
13.

2010 because
14.

Hoffman opined that Burns Concrete
it

was

a ﬁscally prudent choice. (See Tr., P. 567: 10-17.)

According

temporary plant,

it

voluntarily closed the temporary plant in

t0

Hoffman’s projections,

would have expected

APPELLANT’ s BRIEF — Page
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if Burns

Concrete would not have closed the

total sales ofjust $ 1 ,016,938, as follows:

a.

From February 2010 through the end of that

year,

Burns Concrete would have

generated $ 1 58,869 in sales.

Burns Concrete would have generated $126,693 in

b.

In 201

c.

In 2012, Burns Concrete

would have generated $197,078

in sales.

d.

In 2013, Burns Concrete

would have generated $197,078

in sales.

e.

In 2014, Burns Concrete

would have generated $293,606

in sales.

1,

sales.

(TL, P. 547, L. 4.) The sales would not have generated enough revenue t0 maintain operations.

After servicing the debt, Burns Concrete’s shareholders would have suffered losses year-over-

year from 2007 through 2016. (See
originally planned,

into the

P1.

EX. 32.) In order t0 keep the temporary plant operating as

Burns Concrete would have been required

temporary plant t0 stay in business through 2015.
15.

(Tr., P.

The Burns Concrete ﬁnancial statements showed

wherewithal t0 cover the debt.

(Tr., P.

stay in business for a full year. (TL, P. 559, L. 17.)

567, L. 23.)

that

it

In 2007, the Teton

t0

The “Going Concern” notes remained present
(Tr., P.

575, L. 18.)

County Board of Commissioners denied a request from Burns

Holdings for a conditional use permit t0 exceed the county’s height
17.

did not have the

company may not have enough resources

Burns Concrete’s ﬁnancial statements through December 31, 2016.
16.

an additional $ 1 ,589,000

557, L. 9.) Burns Concrete’s Financial Statements

included “Going Concern” notes indicating that the

in

to invest

limit. (Tr., P.

396, L. 16.)

Then, in 2012, the Teton County Board 0f Commissioners denied an application

for a variance t0 exceed the height limit. (TL, P. 396, L. 22.)

APPELLANT’ s BRIEF — Page 6

On April

18.

9,

2012, Teton County sent a

authority t0 operate the temporary plant and

letter to

demanding

that

it

Burns Concrete revoking
be removed by July

1,

its

2012.

(A.R., P. 85.)

On October 4,

19.

2012, Teton County sent a

letter t0

Burns Concrete

stating,

among

other things, the following:

The County has revoked Burns Holdings
“temporary

Please

facility.”

authority t0 operate their

[sic]

commence removal

activity immediately.

(A.R., P. 54.)

Plaintiffs did not

20.

16.)

remove the temporary plant.

The temporary plant has not ever been removed.
Plaintiffs did not cease operations

21.

April

9,

2012 or October

4,

2012

letters.

(Tr., P.

414, L. 18, Tr., P. 415, L.

(Id.)

0f the temporary plant in response t0 the

By 2010, two

years before the

letters,

Burns Concrete

closed the temporary plant. According t0 Burns Concrete, the publicity from this court case

caused the shut down:
Well,

it

pretty

much

stopped

all

Moeller ruled against us, there was newspaper
Burns’ plant is — is extinguished.
It’s like

there

was continual

By the time when — When Judge

the customers.

articles to the effect

mean, people were — people
had phone calls saying, We can’t buy

articles in the paper. I

were scared t0 death at that point. We
from you now. You’re a sole source. You can’t

just

(TL, P. 260, L. 14; see also Tr., P. 41

“Everybody

said,

You

(TL, P. 261 :21-25.)

can’t d0

By 2010,
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it,

0f Burns —

1,

L. 13.)

run.

Burns continued t0 explain

that, in

and you’re an eyesore, and you’re blocked

in

2010,

Teton County.”

Kirk Burns decided that he did not want t0 move forward with the

operation, and this conviction

was strengthened

in 2012. (TL, P. 408, L. 16-21.)

Concrete was done doing business in Teton County.
22.

On May

10,

(the “Assignment”). (EX. 5.)

The Assignment purports

undivided interest in

t0 assign

from Burns Holdings

t0

Burns Concrete “an

0f Burns Holdings’ right and beneﬁts and duties and obligations

all

and under the Agreement, including
Burns Holdings related

409, L. 4.)

2013, Burns Concrete and Burns Holdings entered an Assignment

and Assumption Agreement
23.

(Tr., P.

By 2012, Burns

all

in, t0,

claims causes of action, and rights of enforcement of

t0 the [Developer’s]

Agreement,

that are

now

in existence 0r

may

hereafter arise”. (EX. 5, P. 2.) Similarly, Burns Concrete purported t0 assign t0 Burns Holdings

“an undivided interest in

all

claims and causes 0f action 0f Burns Concrete, whether sounding in

0r arising under contract, statute, ordinance, or otherwise, related to the Property and/or the

Agreement
24.

that are

The

now

in existence 0r

Parties t0 the

may hereafter arise.”

Assignment did not intend

or relinquish control. According t0 Burns Holdings,

transfer all

it

(EX. 5, P. 2.)

to

was not

make

a complete transfer of rights

the intent that “Burns Holdings

0f its claims against Teton County t0 Burns Concrete.” (TL,

P. 407, L. 5.)

It

understood that Burns Holdings would maintain control 0f and participate in the claim. (TL, P.
408, L.

8.)

25.

On May 21,

2013, within two week 0f the Assignment, the Burns Companies ﬁled

this action. (R., P. 20.)
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At

26.

reliance

damages

trial,

the Burns

Companies identiﬁed

in Exhibit 8 (the

all

claimed expenditures related t0

“Claimed Damages”). (TL,

P. 21, L. 15; Tr. P. 61, L. 21; Tr.

P. 62, L.3; Ex. 8.)

The Claimed Damages were not generated from accounting software and they

27.

were not standard ﬁnancial

reports. (Tr., P. 177, L. 16; Tr., P. 178, L.7.)

were developed by the Burns Companies With the assistance of their
It

took a year t0 prepare the Claimed Damages. (TL, P. 178, L.

The Claimed Damages

attorney. (TL, P. 178, L. 5.)

15.)

The Claimed Damages d0 not include any expenditures 0f Burns Holdings. (TL,

28.

P. 119, L. 10.)

The expenses

in

Claimed Damages are solely from Burns Concrete. (TL,

P. 120,

L. 20.)

29.

The Claimed Damages include expenditures incurred prior

August 31, 2007 Agreement. (See EX.
30.

(Compare EX.
3

(See EX.

1.

t0 the execution

of the

8.)

The Claimed Damages include expenses incurred

prior to the Assignment.

5 with EX. 8.)

The Claimed Damages include expenses incurred

after the

October

4,

2012

letter.

8.)

32.

The Claimed Damages include proposed demobilization

are speculative costs that have not

33.

plant because

According
it

t0

been incurred nor paid. (See EX.

Burns Concrete’s own calculations,

did not have enough sales volume t0 cover

L. 18; see EX. 7.)
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its

it

costs. (R., P. 214.)

These

8.)

lost

money 0n the temporary

costs. (TL, P. 14, L. 12; Tr., P. 19,

Because the Burns Companies would not have generated proﬁts

34.

had been

fully performed, they should not

II.

be able

to collect

ISSUES PRESENTED

The

issues Teton

County presents on appeal

1.

Whether the

district court erred in

2.

Whether the

district court erred in granting

if the

Agreement

damages upon breach.

ON APPEAL

are:

awarding damages

t0 the

Burns Companies;

summary judgment on

liability for

breach

0f the Developer’s Agreement; and
3.

Whether the

district court erred in granting declaratory judgment.

III.

ATTORNEY’S FEES ON APPEAL

Teton County claims attorney’s fees 0n appeal pursuant

to

Paragraph 12(6) 0f the

Developer’s Agreement.

ARGUMENT

IV.

The standard of review involves
judgment and

legal

and factual determinations made

at

trial.

The Idaho Supreme Court “employs

the

same standard

as the district court

reviewing rulings 0n summary judgment motions.” Security Investor Fund LLC
Idaho 280,

_,

summary

443 P.3d 1036, 1041 (2019)

(citing

La Bella

805, 353 P.3d 420, 426 (2015)). “The court must grant
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Vita,

LLC v.

v.

When
Crumb, 165

Shuler, 158 Idaho 799,

summary judgment

if the

movant shows

that there is

no genuine dispute

as to

any material

fact

and the movant

is

entitled to

judgment

as a

matter 0f law.” Security Investor, 165 Idaho at _, 443 P.3d at 1042. The same standard applies

When reviewing

a motion t0 reconsider

summary judgment.

The standard 0f review following a bench
supports the

trial

law.” Johnson
Ins. C0.

v.

v.

court’s ﬁndings 0f fact,

The Idaho Supreme Court

Ins. C0.

443 P.3d

at 1042.

limited t0 “whether the evidence

and whether those ﬁndings support the conclusions of

Corssett, 163 Idaho 200, 204,

Farm Bureau Mut.

trial is

Id.,

408 P.3d 1272, 1276 (2017)

(citing

Oregon Mut.

ofldaho, 148 Idaho 47, 50, 218 P.3d 391, 394 (2009)).

will “exercise free review over the lower court’s conclusions 0f law,

however, t0 determine whether the court correctly stated the applicable law, and Whether the
legal conclusions are sustained

by the

facts found.” Pocatello

Hosp,

LLC v.

Quail Ridge

Medical Investor, LLC, 156 Idaho 709, 714, 330 P.3d 1067, 1072 (2014) (quoting Clayson

v.

Zebe, 153 Idaho 228, 232, 280 P.3d 731, 735 (2012)).

A. The district court erred in awarding damages t0 the

Burns Companies.
Teton County challenges the
this

district court’s

award 0f damages.

First,

Teton County urges

Court t0 limit reliance damages t0 those cases where expectation damages cannot be

ascertained. Second,

Where reliance damages are allowed, the amount 0f damages should be

limited t0 prevent a Windfall. Third, a claimant should prove that a particular contractual breach

caused the reliance damage. Fourth, reliance damages should be limited t0 expenses incurred

from the time 0f agreement

t0 the point
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Where reliance

is

n0 longer reasonable.

Finally, insofar

as the district court correctly stated the law,

facts

it

its

calculation of damages

is

not sustained by the

found.

1.

The

The Idaho Supreme Court should limit reliance
damages Where expectation damages are available.

district court

available. (R., P. 92.)

improperly allowed reliance damages Where contract damages were

A plaintiff in a breach 0f contract case may forego lost proﬁts and instead

seek reliance damages. 22

Am.

Jur.

2d Damages

§

63 (“where a court cannot measure lost proﬁts

with certainty, contract law protects an injured party’s reliance interest by seeking t0 achieve the
position that

it

would have obtained had

recovery 0f expenditures actually

Am.

2d Damages

Jur.

§ 63.

where expectation damages
Production C0.,

LLC v.

made

the contract never been

in

performance 0r in anticipation of performance.” 22

Many jurisdictions

prevent a party from seeking reliance damages

are ascertainable. Id. See, e.g., Spring

Hess Bakken Invest,

II,

reliance

Creek Exploration

LLC, 887 F.3d 1003,1026-27

Teton County urges the Idaho Supreme Court to adopt

Companies from pursuing

made, usually through the

this limitation

&

(10th Cir. 2018).

and preclude the Burns

damages when expectation damages

are available.

This Court has barred equitable remedies Where a claimant can proceed in contract. For

example,
Vreeken

if a contract

v.

remedy

is

available, then a plaintiff cannot elect

Lockwood Eng, 148 Idaho

89, 105,

an equitable remedy.

218 P.3d 1150, 1166 (2009)

(“It is

well

established that equitable remedies Will not be allowed if adequate remedies are available at

law”)
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This Court has

rej ected tort—type

damages

in contract disputes. See, e.g.,

Hummer v.

Evans, 129 Idaho 274, 923 P.2d 981 (1996) (holding that a cause 0f action for wrongful
termination sounded in contract, rather than

measure 0f recovery) (“The rule

is

that the

tort,

and

that contract

measure 0f damages

is

the loss suffered as the result 0f the breach 0f contract”). See also

damages were the only
such as will compensate for

King v. Beatrice Foods C0. 89
,

Idaho 52, 402 P.2d 966 (1965).

The law of contract damages
disappointed promisee

is

reasonably calculated t0

is

well developed. In breach 0f contract cases, “the

generally entitled to an award of money damages in an

make him

0r her Whole and neither

more 0r

less;

amount

any greater sum

operates to punish the breaching promisor and results in an unwarranted Windfall to the

promises.” 24 Williston on Contracts § 64: 1. Courts refer t0 this measure of contract damages as
expectation damages. See Restatement (2d) of Contracts § 344.
Contract, tort and equitable

damage

theories should not be conﬂated. Adopting a reliance

measure of damages, particularly as applied by the

district court,

would allow a party injured by

a minor or inconsequential breach to recover the same amount as a party induced into an

agreement by fraud. The damage award should have some rational relationship t0 the breaching
party’s conduct and wrongdoing.

Companies

In this case, the Burns

are capable of measuring expectation damages.

Burns Companies produced an income statement limited

2007 through 2010. (EX.

11.)

t0 operations at the

The Burns Companies simply refused

damages, seeking more lucrative reliance damages instead.
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Driggs

The

facility

t0 calculate expectation

from

2.

Even

if this

Reliance damages should be capped t0 prevent injustice.

Court were t0 allow reliance damages where expectation damages are

available, those reliance

plaintiff should not

damages should be limited

be allowed

t0 recover reliance

performance would have equaled 0r exceeded

Damages
by

§ 65. In other

its

to avoid punitive results. (R., P. 95.)

damages

if

“the plaintiff’s losses

reliance expenditures.”

22 Am.

A

upon

Jur.

full

2d

words, a plaintiff should not “escape the consequences 0f a bad bargain

asserting a reliance interest.” Id.

Reliance damages are calculated as plaintiff” s expenditures

amount 0f unnecessary expenditures and

less the

amount the

made

in performance, less the

plaintiff would

have

lost

had the

defendant fully performed absent the breach. Restatement (3 d) Restitution § 38. Reliance

damages, compensate the plaintiff “for any reasonably foreseeable costs incurred 0r expenditures

made

in reliance

0n the promise

that has

now been broken.” See Sullivan

738, 864 P.2d 184 (Ct. App. 1993) (overruling

trial

court’s

v.

Bullock, 124 Idaho

award 0f damages where court

improperly failed t0 deduct amounts plaintiff saved as a result 0f the defendant’s breach). See
also

Young Elec. Sign C0.

v.

Capps, 94 Idaho 318, 492 P.2d 57 (1971).

A cap on recovery is particularly appropriate in the context of a losing contract. A “losing
contract”

is

one which,

if fully

performed, would result in a loss 0f money to the

opportunistic plaintiff faced with a losing contract

may

plaintiff.

An

seek to avoid the loss by foregoing

expectation damages (the lost proﬁts Which did not exist) and electing reliance damages (out-of—

pocket expenses). This theory,

break even by recovering

all

if

allowed, would permit a plaintiff t0 avoid a bad investment and

expenses. Such a result
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would be

unjust.

Agam

v.

Gavra, 236 Cal. App.

agreement to develop real

The

partners sued.

breaching partners.
in the context

trial

estate.

4th

91, 106 (Cal. 6th Dist. Ct.

The development collapsed With

App. 2015) involved an

the housing market crash and

court allowed reliance damages, resulting in a Windfall t0 the non-

On appeal,

the reviewing court recognized the inequity of reliance

damages

of a losing contract and reversed, explaining:

Courts also have recognized a second limitation on reliance damages awards

from proof 0f unnecessary expenditures) — proof that the plaintiff would
have suffered a loss even in the defendant had fully performed. “[I]n such a case
the plaintiff should not be permitted to escape the consequences 0f a bad bargain
by falling back on his reliance interest.” Put differently, the plaintiff should not be
put “in a better position than he would have occupied had the contract been fully
(aside

performed.” Thus,

much

allow the breaching party t0 prove the
nonbreaching party’s expenditures were unnecessary, courts allow the breaching
like courts

party “t0 reduce [the nonbreaching party’s recovery’
that the [nonbreaching party] would have
performed.”

Agam, 236

Cal.

App.

4th at

lost, if the

by

as

much

contract

as he can

show

had been

106 (internal citations omitted) (alterations

in original).

This Court’s has expressed similar restraint in awarding unjust damages. See,

89 Idaho
reliance

402 P.2d

at

970 (holding

amounts would be subsumed by

damages

3

at 59,

that reliance

lost

e.g.,

King,

damages were not available Where the

proﬁt damages). The

district court

adopted a cap on

in this case.3 (R., P. 217-219.)

Although the

district court

district court

purported t0 adopt a cap on reliance damages (R., P. 217-219), the
its ﬁndings to effect the cap (Compare R., P. 213

did not properly apply the law t0

with R., P. 221.) Teton County’s challenge t0 the calculation 0f damages

below.
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is

discussed

more

fully

Reliance damages should be limited t0 those expenses

3.

that the

Burns Companies incurred

in reliance

on the

promise breached.
Causation

a necessary element of a breach 0f contract claim (as discussed below) and

is

relevant to reasonableness in the calculation of damages. Reliance

plaintiff

.

.

.

that “a

demonstrate that damages were caused by and are directly traceable t0 the

defendant’s breach
link.”

damages require

Goldberg

v.

.

.

.

Even plaintiffs seeking

reliance

Paris Hilton Entm’t, Ina, 2009

damages must

establish this causal

WL 2525482, at *3 (SD. Fla. Aug.

2009) (internal alterations and quotations omitted). The

district court failed t0

17,

consider causation

as part 0f its calculation 0f damages. (See R., P. 246, 247.) Contrary t0 the district court’s

recitation

show

0f law, reliance damages should only be awarded where the Burns Companies can

a causal link between a contractual breach and a reasonable expense.

4.

Reliance damages should be limited in duration from
the time 0f agreement until reliance

is

unreasonable.

Reliance damages are generally “available for injuries resulting from activities that
occurred either before 0r after the breach.” Glendale Fed. Bank,

1383 (Fed.

Cir.

2001) (recognizing “in reliance damages the

FSB

critical

v.

U.S.,

event

is

Reliance damages should be limited in duration. Because reliance damages

an agreement, the date 0f the agreement should be the

Moreover, reliance damages should end when

it is

earliest

239 F.3d 1374,
the breach itself”).

ﬂow from reliance on

time for damages to accrue.

n0 longer reasonable

to incur additional

expenses in reliance 0n the promise that has been breached. The parameters of available reliance

damages should be

clearly deﬁned.
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To

begin, reliance

damages should commence no

earlier than the date

of agreement.

“Reliance damages in breach-of—contract cases are limited t0 those expenses incurred after an

agreement has been reached.” 22
U.S.,

47 Fed.

C1.

Cir. 2002)). In

Am.

382 (2000), aﬂ’d

Jur.

in part,

2d Damages

§

62 (citing Energy Capital Corp.

v.

rev’d in part 0n other grounds, 302 F.3d 1314 (Fed.

accord Farnsworth, Contracts

§ 12.16, at

928

n.

are limited t0 those expenses incurred after an agreement has

2 (2d ed.) (“Reliance damages

been reached”). “Because reliance

damages seek to measure an injured party's cost of reliance" on a breached

contract, that party

may not recover for costs

Am.

Damages

incurred prior t0

its

execution 0f the contract.” 22

62 (Citing DPJ C0. Ltd. Partnership

§

Contrary to

this

overwhelming

v.

F.D.I. C.,

30 F.3d 247 (1“

Jur.

2d

Cir. 1994)).

authority, the district court allowed pre-contract

damages.

(R., P.

2 1 9-22 1 .)

To
this case,

end, reliance

damages should be limited

to that period

an outside date can be ascertained, even in

a plaintiff can recover

all

expenses

made

in reliance

light

0f the

Where reliance

is

reasonable. In

district court’s interpretation that

0n the agreement. Idaho’s Local Land Use

Planning Act gives property owners a four-year right to a requested zone change.
If a

governing board adopts a zoning classiﬁcation pursuant to a request by a

property owner based upon a valid, existing comprehensive plan and zoning
ordinance, the governing board shall not subsequently reverse

its

action otherwise

change the zoning classiﬁcation 0f said property without the consent in writing of
the current property owner for a period of four (4) years from the date the
governing board adopted said individual property owner's request for a zoning
classiﬁcation change.

Idaho Code § 67-651 1(2)(d). (Supp. R., P. 40.) This provision was in place prior t0 the 2007
rezone in this case. See 2003 Idaho Laws Ch. 142 (H.B. 257). After the four-year period, the
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governing board can rezone the property. In

February 26, 2007. (EX.

P., P. 8.)

this case,

By February 26,

201

Teton County approved the rezone on
1,

Teton County was authorized by

The Burns Companies had n0 reasonable

to rezone the Property.

basis t0 continue t0 rely

statute

0n the

rezone portion of the Agreement after the expiration of four-years.

Moreover, reliance damages should be limited t0 expenses actually incurred during the
period

When reliance

is

reasonable. Authority relied

upon by the

district court limits

recovery t0

“out—of-pocket expenses incurred in anticipation 0f mutual performance 0n the contract.” (R.,
P.

92

(citing

Brown

v.

Yacht Club 0fCoeur d’Alene, Ltd., 111 Idaho 195, 198-200, 722 P.2d

1062, 1065-67 (Ct. App. 1986).) However, the district court awarded demolition costs. (R., P.
214.) Speculative and unrealized expenses are not recoverable as “out-of-pocket expenses”.

0n damages identiﬁed

In addition t0 the other limitations

in this Brief,

limited to those expenses actually incurred during a speciﬁc duration.

actual expenses incurred

became unreasonable,
5.

n0

earlier than

in this case

The

no

damages should be

Damages should

include

August 3 1 2007 and end When reliance 0n the promise
,

later

district court

than February 26, 201

1.

erred in calculating damages.

Adopting any 0f the legal standards urged here requires adjustment

t0 the district court’s

calculation of damages. Requiring proof 0f causation, disallowing expenditures prior t0 the

execution 0f the agreement and after reliance became unreasonable, and excluding unrealized

damages

Will cause a reduction 0r elimination of any

damages award. However, even accepting

the district court’s legal standard, a signiﬁcant reduction
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is still

required.

In anticipation of trial, Teton

among

County ﬁled a motion

in limine asking the district court,

other things, to identify the appropriate measure 0f damages. (Supp. R., P. 58.) In a

memorandum

decision, the district court held:

would have suffered a loss in operating the temporary plant, the
amount 0f that loss should be accounted for When determining the amount of
Burns Holdings’ damages based 0n reliance interest. Otherwise, Burns Holdings
would receive a windfall from having the County pay all of its reliance
expenditures without any consideration 0f money Burns Holdings ultimately
would have lost had there not been a breach.
If Plaintiffs

(R., P. 75.)

At

trial,

Teton County presented an income statement prepared by Burns Concrete

showing actual losses 0f nearly $4 million. (EX. 7 shows

sales

amortized expenses, and write-offs of $4,499,213.49 for a

of $625,420.77

total loss

less costs

of sales,

of $3,873,792.72.) Forensic

accountant Richard Hoffman used the Burns Concrete ﬁnancial statements and other data t0
calculate net incremental proﬁts

and cash available

to equity holders. (See EX. 3

1 .)

Hoffman

projected substantial losses from 2007 through 2016, With a small proﬁt in 2017, as follows:

Year
2007
2008
2009
2010 (Jan)
2010 (Feb-Dec)
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
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Expected Net
Incremental Proﬁt
$

1,595

Cash Available

for

Equity Holders
-

$

12,969

-

6,936

-

69

48,480

287,479
293,513
-

24,968

42,280

-

233,131

25,689

-

274,759

33,717

-

266,731

52,449

-

248,000

52,449

-

78,138
88,307

115,602

248,000
-222,310
-

212,142
115,602

(Ex. 3 1; Ex. R., P. 158, 160.)

to sustain these losses

Hoffman explained

that

While maintaining operations.

Burns Concrete would not have been able

(T11, P.

540, L. 19.) In order t0 survive the

ﬁnancial downturn, Burns Concrete would have been required to close operations and

— which

is

In

what
its

it

sell assets

did. (Id.)

post-trial Findings, the district court stated:

Burns Concrete made an incremental proﬁt every year it operated the temporary
If Burns Concrete had been able t0 continue operating the temporary
facility.
facility it would have made incremental proﬁts every year from 2010 0n. Burns
Concrete’s revenues would have permitted it t0 recover its costs over time, pay
off all of its debt and produced a net income by 2017.
.

.

.

(R., P. 213.) Additionally, the district court found:

suffered a net loss

When

“During

its

operation, the temporary facility

considering incremental proﬁts, debt service, and sunk costs. (R., P.

242.)

Although the
district court

that

district court’s

ﬁndings are consistent with Hoffman’s testimony, the

did not cap the Burns Companies’ recovery. Rather, the district court concluded

“Teton County did not establish

Plaintiffs

additional offset.” (R., P. 221.) If the Burns

the relevant

would have suffered

losses entitling

Companies were not able
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t0

an

to generate proﬁts during

damages period, then the damage award should be capped. The

misapplied the law.

them

district court

B.

The

district court

liability for

The
County

is

district court

liable for

contract are

“(21)

erred in granting

summary judgment 0n

breach of the Agreement.

did not correctly state the applicable law in concluding that Teton

breach 0f contract damages. (R., P. 66, 83.) The elements of breach 0f

the existence 0f the contract, (b) the breach 0f the contract, (c) the breach

caused damages, and (d) the amount 0f those damages.” Hull

P.3d 507, 516 (2014) (citing Mosell Equities,

LLC v.

v.

Berryhill

Giesler, 156 Idaho 765, 774, 331

& C0.,

154 Idaho 269, 278, 297

P.3d 232, 241 (2013)). “The plaintiff has the burden t0 prove that he was injured and his injury

was

the result 0f the defendant’s breach; ‘both

amount and causation must be proven with

reasonable certainty.’” Hull, 156 Idaho at 774, 331 P.3d at 516 (quoting Harris, Inc.

Foxhollow Constr.
the district court

ﬁnding a

&

Trucking, Ina, 151 Idaho 761, 770, 264 P.3d 400, 409 (201

made

a legal error

contract, causation, 0r

factual matter, that

by basing

granted

P. 72.)

the

0n the second element alone, Without

damages. In addition, the

district court erred in

ﬁnding, as a

Teton County’s purported breach did not cause the
Burns Companies’ injuries.

The Burns Companies bifurcated
at

In this case,

Teton County breached the Agreement.
1.

determined

liability

1)).

v.

their

breach 0f contract claim — with

summary judgment and damages determined

summary judgment Without

at trial.

The

trial

liability

court initially

identifying any particular breach, causation or damage. (R.,

Teton County moved for reconsideration, requesting “which provision 0f the contract

County purportedly breached” and “which of the

Plaintiffs is the party injured

breach.” (Supp. R., P. 67.) Teton County asserted that Burns Concrete
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.

.

by the

was not damaged by the

.

alleged breach because

did not

it

t0 the

County’s demand and

County’s demand. (Supp. R.,

P. 69-70.) In post-trial

had ceased operation of the plant prior

move the plant in response

t0 the

it

brieﬁng, Teton County again raised the element 0f causation, asserting “reliance damages are
limited to those expenditures caused to a contracting party

by a

contractual breach.” (Supp. R., P.

252.) However, the district court identiﬁed the applicable law as:

Reliance damages include expenses reasonably related t0 the purpose 0f the
contract

(R., P. 246.)

which would not have been incurred but

Applying

this law, the district court

made

for the contract’s existence.

the following ﬁnding:

Burns Concrete incurred $1,461,393.53 in losses caused by its reliance 0n the
Agreement. Those reliance damages were reasonably related t0 the Agreement’s
purpose. Burns Concrete would not have incurred the expenses if not for the
Agreement’s existence.
(R., P. 247.)

It is

black

letter

law

that breach

0f contract damages must be caused by the defendant’s

breach. “In an action for breach 0f contract, reliance

damages are awarded only when the

expenses would not have been incurred but for reliance on the contractual obligation not
performed.” 22

Am.

Jur.

2d Damages

§

66 (2d

ed.

2019) (damages are limited

t0 “losses actually

sustained as a result 0f the breach of that promise”). “Reliance damages are designed t0

compensate the
reliance

plaintiff for

0n the promise

any reasonably foreseeable costs incurred 0r expenditures made

that has

now been broken.” 24

in

Williston 0n Contracts § 64:4 (4th ed.

2019)
The necessity 0f causation
Gentleman, LLC.

v.

in

awarding reliance damages

George and Leona Productions, Inc, 76
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F.

is

discussed at length in

Supp. 3d 756, 761 (N.D.

Merry
Ill

2014). “The underlying principle in reliance damages

party's

promise made binding through contract

is

FSB

v.

that a party

entitled t0

sustained as a result 0f the breach 0f that promise.”

761 (quoting Glendale Fed. Bank,

is

for

0n another

relies

any losses actually

Merry Gentleman, LLC. 76

F.

Supp. 3d

at

United States, 239 F.3d 1374, 1382 (Fed.Cir.2001)).

The causation element does not “evaporate” simply because
rather than expectation damages.

damages

who

plaintiff elects reliance

Merry Gentleman, LLC, 76

F.

Supp. 3d

at 762.

damages

T0 hold

otherwise would render contract damages a penalty rather than compensation, contrary t0 settled
law. Id. In cases

claim

all

Where the breaching party has

substantially performed, the injured party cannot

0f its expenditures as damages, because the breach did not cause the complete loss 0f

the investment. Id.

The injured party must prove a causal

link

between the alleged breaches and

reliance damages. Id.

The
the Burns

district court

found that Teton County breached the Agreement by:

Companies with notice 0f default and opportunity

of the Agreement; and

(b) ordering the

batch plant and remove

covenant of good

faith

the district court arise

it

in Violation

and

Burns Companies

(1) not providing

to cure in Violation

t0 cease operations

of paragraph 8

of the temporary

of paragraph 2(b)(iv) of the Agreement and the implied

fair dealing. (R., P.

from an October

4,

2012

84-86, 21

letter

1.)

The

instances 0f breach identiﬁed

from Teton County

to

Burns Concrete.

(Supp. R., P. 85.) The letter states:

On April

2012 the County sent you a written request t0 remove your
“temporary plant” by July 1, 2012. Nothing has been done t0 remove the
9,

facility

as 0f the date 0f the present letter. In accordance With Paragraph 2(b)(Vi) 0f the

Development Agreement for Burns Holding, LLC, ﬁled in Teton County as
Instrument #191250 on September 5, 2007, the County has revoked Burns
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by

Holding’s authority t0 operate their “temporary plant.” Please

commence removal

activity immediately.

(Aug. R., P. 54.)

The

district court

found that the Burns Companies ceased operation 0f the temporary

batch plant in January 2010 “based,

at least in part,

0n the existence 0f an unfavorable

environment in Teton County, created by the actions of the Teton County Board of

Commissioners.”

(R., P. 209, 213.) In

with the Driggs operation.

(Tr.,

2010, the Burns Companies decided not t0

P.408, L.16.) The Burns Companies have not ever resumed

operations. (See Tr., P. 388, L. 15; Tr, P. 14, L. 6.)

the temporary batch plant. (Tr., P. 414, L. 18.)

and the

trial

move forward

At

The Burns Companies have not ever removed

trial,

the Burns

court did not ﬁnd, a causal link between the 2012

Companies did not

demand

letter

establish,

and any claimed

injury.

Appealing an incorrect legal standard, the

district court

related to the purpose of the Agreement. (R., P. 213.) This

breaches the entire agreement and Vitiates
here.

its

Teton County granted the zone change.

Companies

“clearly beneﬁtted

facility.” (R., P.

2010.”

(161.)

216

n. 3.)

awarded

may be

.)

The

from the zone change and the

is

not the circumstance

district court

found the Burns

ability t0 operate the

temporary

The Burns Companies “made incremental proﬁts from 2007 through

Moreover, “Teton County residents were impacted by

operations.” (Id.)

expenses reasonably

appropriate Where a defendant

purpose. However, that
(R., P. 91

all

[the

An award of all damages related t0 the Agreement,

not proper 0n these facts.
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Burns Companies’]

rather than the breach,

is

The

district court

should have required the Burns Companies to establish, with reasonable

certainty, a causal connection

between the County’s demand

purported injury. Because the

district court failed t0

decision on

The

and the Burns Companies’

apply the appropriate legal standard, the

summary judgment and judgment should be

2.

letter

vacated.

Teton County did not breach the Agreement.

district court erred in

ﬁnding

that

Teton County breached the Agreement. As

discussed above, Teton County purportedly breached by (a) not providing the Burns Companies

with notice of default and opportunity t0 cure in Violation of paragraph 8 of the Agreement; and
(b) ordering the

Burns Companies

t0 cease operation

Violation 0f paragraph 2(b)(iV) 0f the

(R., P. 84-86,

21

1.)

of the temporary plant and remove

Agreement and the covenant 0f good

Teton County understands that

this

Court will “afﬁrm a

0f fact unless those ﬁndings are clearly erroneous.” Hull, 163 Idaho

However, even with

this

heavy burden, Teton County

prove the element 0f breach and the

The
Paragraph 8

district court

based

its

district court’s

faith

at

asserts that the

trial

and

it

fair dealing.

court’s ﬁndings

250, 490 P.3d at 830.

Burns Companies did not

ﬁnding 0f breach should be vacated.

ﬁnding on paragraphs 8 and 2(b)(iV) of the Agreement.

states, in relevant part:

Agreement or of any 0f its terms or
conditions, the party alleging default shall give the breaching party n0 less than
The time of giving 0f the notice
thirty (30) days Notice 0f Default, in writing.
shall be measured from the date of the written Notice of Default. The Notice 0f
Default shall specify the nature 0f the alleged default and, where appropriate, the
manner and period 0f time during Which said default may be satisfactorily cured.
During any period of curing, the party charged shall not be considered in default
In the event 0f a default 0r breach 0f this

.

for the purposes

.

.

of termination 0r zoning reversion, or the
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in

institution

of legal

proceedings. If the default

is

cured, then

no default

shall exist

and the charging

party shall take no further action.
(EX. 3, P. 5.)

Paragraph 2(b)(iV)

states:

Immediately upon execution 0f this Agreement, Developer shall order and
commence construction 0f the Permanent Facility. The installation of the

Permanent Facility shall be completed Within eighteen (1 8) months of execution
0f this Agreement by the County, subj ect t0 delays resulting from weather,
strikes, shortage of steel 0r manufacturing equipment 0r any other act of force
majeure 0r action beyond Developer’s control.
(EX.

3.,

P. 2.)

First, the

Burns Companies had ample notice and opportunity

t0 cure.

On January

12,

2010, Teton County issued a written decision denying the variance for construction 0f the

permanent concrete batch

plant.

(Aug. R., P. 71.)

On April

counsel for the Burns Companies providing until July

1,

9,

2012

2012, Teton County sent a

remove the temporary batch

to

plant 0r provide a written explanation for the delay. (Aug. R., P. 85.)

County again asked the Burns Companies

November

t0

commence removal

2012, Teton County’s attorney sent a

5,

identifying the ﬁrst notice of default dated April 9,

October

4,

letter t0 the

letter to

On October 4,

activity.

2012, Teton

(Aug. R., P. 87.)

On

Burns Companies’ attorney

2012 and the second notice of default dated

2012. (Aug. R., P. 61-62.) This correspondence also recited that the Burns Companies

had no means

to cure. (Aug. R., P. 62.)

During the siX-month period from April

Teton County did not rescind the Agreement, approve a zoning reversion, 0r
proceedings.

On this

breached paragraph

factual record, the district court should not

8.
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to

October 2012,

institute legal

have found that Teton County

Second, Teton County’s request t0 cease operations and remove the temporary plant did
not Violate the Agreement. Although Teton County cited to paragraph 2(b)(iv) 0f the Agreement
as grounds for revocation, the

removal of the temporary
45-feet. (Aug. R., P. 138.)

P. 138.)

County had

facility.

alternative support for cessation

The maximum height permitted 0n

The Burns Companies knew 0f the

The temporary batch plant

is

0f operations and

the subj ect property

applicable height limit. (Aug. R.,

approximately 65-feet high. (TL, P. 388, L.

temporary batch plant violates Teton County’s height

is

restriction.

8.)

The

(Aug. R., P. 138.) The

district

court entered judgment declaring that the temporary facility violates Teton County’s zoning

laws. (Aug. R., P. 185, incorporating

by reference Aug.

R., P. 141;

vacated 0n other grounds,

161 Idaho 117, 384 P.3d 364 (2016).) Because Teton County had independent grounds t0

demand removal of the temporary batch plant,

its

conduct did not Violate paragraph 2(b)(iV) of

the Agreement.

Third, the request for removal did not Violate the implied covenant of good faith and fair

dealing.

The

required t0

Parties expressly contemplated that

comply with

all

Burns Holdings and

its

assignees

would be

local laws governing the property, necessarily including the

applicable height restrictions. (EX. 3, P. 5-6.) Express terms of an agreement negate any

conﬂicting implied covenants. Idaho First Nat.

Bank v.

Bliss Valley Foods, Inc. 121 Idaho 266,

288, 824 P.2d 841, 863 (1991) (“N0 covenant will be implied which
the contract negotiated

height variance

would

and executed by the
Violate the notice

parties”).

contrary t0 the terms 0f

Moreover, an implied covenant allowing a

and hearing requirements 0f the Local Land Use

Planning Act and render the Agreement void. See Cooper
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is

v.

Board ofCounly Commr ’s ofAda

Cty., 101

LLUPA,

Idaho 407, 410-41

1,

614 P2d 947, 950-51 (Idaho 1980) (recognizing

that,

under

a governing board cannot merely accept a land use proposal). The Agreement cannot

implicitly require Teton

County

For these reason, the

t0

approve a temporary plant exceeding

district court’s

ﬁnding

that

its

height restrictions.

Teton County breached the Agreement

should be vacated.

As a matter 0f law, Burns Concrete

3.

to the

The
its

parties t0 the

Findings 0f Fact, the

is

not a party

Agreement.

Agreement

district court

are

Teton County and Burns Holdings. (See EX.

3, P. 1.) In

did not analyze the purported assignment t0 Burns

Concrete under contract law as suggested by Teton County. (Compare R., P. 215, with R., P.
151-53.) Rather, the district court based

Agreement “run with
Concrete

is

conclusion

its

analysis t0 whether the “covenants” contained in the

the land.” (R., P. 215.)

Whether the existence 0f an agreement with Burns

analyzed under the theory of contractual assignment 0r the law 0f real covenants, the
is

the same: Teton

First, there

was not an

County did not have a contract With Burns Concrete.
effective assignment 0f contractual rights.

transfer 0f rights 0r property.” First State

Bank ofEldorado

P.3d 1146, 1150 (2006) (citing Purco Fleet Srvcs.,

Inc.

v.

v.

An assignment is

a

Rowe, 142 Idaho 608, 612, 130

Idaho State Dep ’t 0fFinance, 140

Idaho 121, 125, 9O P.3d 346, 350 (2004)). “T0 be effective, an assignment must be completed

with a delivery, and the delivery must confer a complete and present right on the transferee. The
assignor must not retain control over the properly assigned, the authority t0 collect, 0r the
t0 revoke.” First State

Bank, 142 Idaho
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at

power

612, 130 P.3d at 1150 (citing Purco Fleet Srvcs., 140

Idaho

at 125,

90 P.3d

transfers to the assignee

v.

“An assignment 0f a chose

and divests the assignor 0f all control and

and the assignee becomes the
Center

(emphasis in original».

at 350.)

real party in interest.” St.

in action

right t0 the cause

0f action,

Luke ’s Magic Valley Regional Medical

Luciani, 154 Idaho 37, 41, 293 P.3d 661, 665 (2013) (internal citations omitted).

Considered separately, the Burns Companies d0 not have a cognizable claim. Burns
Holdings was a party t0 the Agreement, but

Burns Concrete claims damages, but
5.)

The Assignment attempts

t0

it

it

did not suffer any damages. (TL, P. 119, L. 10.)

was not a party t0

the Agreement. (Tr., P. 120, L. 20; EX.

merge Burns Holding’s contract with Burns Concrete’s

damages. However, an assignment

is

not supported by the factual record 0r legal requirements.

During the course 0f the Agreement, Burns Holdings applied for a rezone, applied for a
conditional use permit, applied for a variance, and pursued judicial review. Burns Holdings did

not join Burns Concrete t0 the applications or as a necessary party in
Property. (See Docket, Case No.

T0

the extent Burns Holdings

transfer that claim to

collect.

CV-2007-376 (Idaho

Dist,

prior suit regarding the

Teton Cnty., ﬁled Dec.

had a claim against Teton County, Burns Holdings

Burns Concrete because

(TL, P. 407, L.

7th

its

5; Tr., P.

408, L.

contract claim against Teton County,

its

it

11, 2007.)

failed t0

did not relinquish control or the authority to

8.) Similarly, to

the extent Burns Concrete

attempt to assign that claim failed because

had any
it

did not

relinquish control and the authority to collect. (Id.) Retention of control defeats both attempted

assignments. The Burns Companies are

left t0

pursue their separate and independent claims,

Without merging those claims as a single chose in action.
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Second, the contract claims against Teton County do not run With the land.
action arising out 0f the Violation of a right or property, 0r out 0f an obligation,
the owner.” Idaho

transferred

by

assignable

by the owner;

101.

it is

Code

§ 55-102.

A chose in action is personal property —

real property interests capable

t0

district court (R., P. 215),

Code

§ 55-

0f running with the land, such

as the limited right t0 the rezone. (EX. 3, P. 1.) If the chose in action

implied by the

in

may be

not real property bound to land ownership. See Idaho

The Agreement includes some

“A thing

were

real property, as

then Burns Holdings would not have had the authority

bind the owner, and the Burns Companies would not have had the authority t0 assign their

respective claims.

The

district court’s

Burns Concrete

C.

is

conclusion that Teton County

is liable t0

both Burns Holdings and

accordingly ﬂawed.

The

erred in granting declaratory judgment,
because the issue was not tried and it could allow double
district court

recovery.

The

district court

should not have issued declaratory judgment. Following the

court’s entry 0f Findings of Fact

judgment include a

and Conclusions 0f Law, the Burns Companies proposed

declaration. (Supp. R., P. 405.)

The

Parties did not try the

declaratory judgment claim. (Id.) However, the district court included a
the Judgment. (R., P. 272.) Teton

The

district court is

County appeals the

that

Burns Companies

modiﬁed

declaration in

declaration.

authorized to determine questions of contractual rights. Uniform

Declaratory Judgment Act, Idaho
Plaintiffs bear the

district

Code §§ 10-1201 through 10-1217. See

burden 0f showing that an actual controversy
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exists.

also I.R.C.P. 57.

Davidson

v.

Wright, 143

Idaho 616, 620, 151 P.3d 812, 816 (2006). In addition, a plaintiff must show ripeness by
establishing that “court action

is

necessary at the present time.” Schneider

767, 773, 133 P.3d 1232, 1238 (2006). See also Porter

368-69 (1907)
litigants,

(“It is the

v.

v.

Howe, 142 Idaho

Speno, 13 Idaho 600, 603, 92 P. 367,

province 0f this court t0 hear and determine real controversies between

but not moot questions”).

A question is moot when “the issues presented are n0 longer

live 0r the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the

outcome.” Bradshaw

v.

State,

120

Idaho 429, 432, 816 P.2d 986, 989 (1991).
In the post-trial posture of this proceeding, the requested declaration

ripe.

Teton County had Withdrawn

its

was moot and not

breach 0f contract claim against the Burns Companies, and

monetary damages were resolved. The question addressed by the declaration was no longer

The

Parties did not try the declaratory judgment claim at

the Burns

As

Companies met

their

trial,

and the record does not reﬂect

burden of proving that a declaration should

unclear.

trial,

that

issue.

a practical matter, inclusion 0f the declaration in the judgment presents the possibility

0f confusion and double recovery. The meaning 0f the declaration in
is

alive.

The

district court

awarded damages

as well as future anticipated damages.

V.
This appeal involves

0f the damage award

Burns Companies for expenditures through

An additional declaratory judgment binding the land

could present ongoing obligations and future
issue declaratory judgment in favor 0f the

to the

light

liabilities.

The

district court

should have declined to

Burns Companies.

CONCLUSION

many legal and factual

challenges.

It

presents this Court With an

opportunity to further deﬁne the role of reliance damages in the context 0f breach of contract
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claims. Teton

reliance

County urges

damages

this

Court to consider practical considerations in limiting where

are available. If expectation

damages may be

calculated, then reliance

damages

should not be allowed. Damages should be capped to avoid punitive results and unjust recovery

on a bad bargain. The element 0f causation should
breach — rather than

all

limit

damages

expenses related to a contract. The

summary judgment should be examined

in light

to those injuries caused

district court’s

by a

ﬁnding 0f breach 0n

0f all four elements 0f the claim, including the

element of causation. The element of breach should also be examined, because the factual record

shows

that

Teton County acted within

its

and provided notice consistent With the

rights

Agreement. Finally, Teton County requests that

between the Burns Companies and

this

Court scrutinize the attempted assignment

clarify that land use claims

can be severed from the land, but

they cannot be merged.
Respectfully submitted on September 30, 2019.

COUNTY
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
OFFICE OF THE TETON

Siddowav
Siddoway
By:
Counselfor Teton County
/s/ Billie J.

Billie
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J.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned

certiﬁes that date set forth below, a true and correct

foregoing was caused to be ﬁled electronically With automated service

Robert B. Burns

rburns@parsonsbehle.com
Parsons Behle & Latimer

800 West Main St Ste 1300
Boise, ID 83702
Fax: 208-562-4901

Dated: September 30, 2019.

/s/ Billie
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Siddoan

t0:

copy of the

